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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVERSTATEMENTS OF BASIS
Richard T. Rice, Esquire
Retired Member, Womble Carlye Sandridge & Rice, LLP
Winston-Salem, NC
I.

QUESTION PRESENTED

In United States of America v. Home Concrete
Supply, LLC,__U.S__, 132 S.Ct. 1836, 182 L.Ed.2d
(2012), the United States Supreme Court addressed
following issue:

and
746
the

Whether the IRS has three years or six
years to assess a deficiency against a
taxpayer when the taxpayer overstates his
basis in property that he has sold,
thereby understating the gain that he
received from its sale.
On April 25, 2012, the Supreme Court followed its prior
holding in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)
by holding that the three year - not the six year - statute
applies.
II.

THE STATUTE

The Internal Revenue Code requires the IRS to assess
additional tax within three years of the date a tax return
is filed, unless a statutory exception applies. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(a) (2000 ed.). The exception that became the focus
in the Home Concrete case is the one found in 26 U.S.C. §
6501(e)(1)(A) which extends the three year period to six
years when a taxpayer:
omits from gross income an amount properly
includable therein which is in excess of 25
percent of the amount of gross income stated in
the return.
A.

1

The
quoted
language
is
materially
1
indistinguishable
from
the
provision
originally enacted by Congress in 1934 when

In 1954, “percentum” was
6501(e)(1)(A) (2000 ed.).

replaced

1

with

“percent.”

See

26

U.S.C.

§

the normal three year limitations period was
extended from three years to five years for
cases involving taxpayer omissions from gross
income. 26 U.S.C. § 275(c) (1940 ed.).
B.

The relevant version of the statute for the
Home Concrete case was recodified in 1954,
when Congress reenacted the entire Internal
Revenue Code.
As mentioned, the quoted
provision was carried forward and recodified
as §6501(e)(1)(A).2
However, Congress also
added two new subparagraphs to §6501(e)(1)(A),
which provided:
For purposes of this subparagraph (i) in the case of a trade or
business,
the
term
“gross
income” means the total of the
amounts received or accrued from
the sale of goods or services
(if such amounts are required to
be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such
sales or services; and
(ii) in
determining
the
amount
omitted from gross income, there
shall not be taken into account
any amount which is omitted from
gross
income
stated
in
the
return
if
such
amount
is
disclosed in the return, or in a
statement
attached
to
the
return, in a manner adequate to
appraise the Secretary or his
delegate
of
the
nature
and
amount of such item.

III.

CASE LAW BEFORE COLONY

The meaning of the phrase “omits from gross income an
amount properly includable therein” was the subject of
2

The new statute changed the extension from two years to three.

2

considerable litigation before the Supreme Court addressed
the issue in Colony, as follows:
A.

In Reis v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d. 900 (6th
Cir. 1944), the Sixth Circuit found that there
was an omission from gross income where the
taxpayer in question overstated his basis in
certain pieces of property that he sold, thus
extending the statute of limitations from
three years to five years.

B.

In Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204
F.2d. 570 (3rd Cir. 1953), the Third Circuit
addressed the same language in a case where
the taxpayer was a manufacturing corporation
that inappropriately included a reserve for
retroactive wage increases in its cost of
goods sold - thus, arriving at an incorrect
gross profit from sales. After reviewing the
legislative
history,
the
Third
Circuit
concluded that:
The
history
of
Section
275(c)
persuasively indicates that Congress
was addressing itself particularly
to the situation where a taxpayer
shall fail to include some receipt
or accrual in his computation of
gross income and not in a more
general way to errors of whatever
kind in that computation.
Id. at 572.
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the
three year, not the five year, statute of
limitations applied.

C.

The Ninth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits agreed
with Uptegrove Lumber, holding that the
statute of limitations could not be extended
in situations where the taxpayers included
their gross receipts, but erred in their
computation of taxable incomes. See Slaff v.
Commissioner, 220 F.2d. 65 (9th Cir. 1955);
3

Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d. 549 (5th Cir.
1956); Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d. 20
(8th Cir. 1956).
IV.

THE COLONY DECISION
A.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Colony involved a situation where the taxpayer
allegedly “understated the gross profits on
the sales of certain lots of land for
residential purposes as a result of having
overstated the “basis” of such lots by
erroneously including in their costs certain
unallowable items of development expense.”
357 U.S. at 30.
After the Tax Court found that the extended
(five year) statute should apply, the Sixth
Circuit again faced the question it had
addressed in Reis thirteen years earlier.
Despite the clear conflict in interpretation
of the statute with the Third, Fifth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth circuit adhered
to this earlier ruling, noting that the
“reasoning of these cases is not without
considerable persuasive force, and if the
question were here for the first time, we
might be disposed to follow them.”
Colony,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir.
1957). However, because of Reis Sixth Circuit
declined to follow the other circuits and
affirmed the Tax Court’s decision.

B.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
began its review with the “critical statutory
language, “omits from gross income an amount
properly includable therein.” Id. at 32. The
IRS argued that the Court should focus on the
word “amount” which suggested a concentration
on a quantitative aspect of the error - i.e.,
whether or not gross income was understated by
as much as 25 percent.
The Supreme Court
4

noted that “[t]his view is somewhat reinforced
if, in reading the above -- quoted phrase, one
touches lightly on the word “omits” and bears
down hard on the words “gross income,” for
where a cost item is overstated, as in the
case before us, gross income is affected to
the same degree as when a gross-receipt item
of the same amount is completely omitted from
the tax return.” Id.
The taxpayer, on the other hand, argued that
the IRS’s reading failed to take full account
of the word “omits,” which Congress selected
when it could have chosen something else,
such as “reduces” or “understates.”
The Court agreed with the taxpayer’s argument
that “omit” is to be given the standard
dictionary definition:
“to leave out or
unmentioned; not to insert, include or name.”
Relying on this definition, the
taxpayer
argued that the statute should be limited to
situations in which specific receipts or
accruals of income are left out of the
computation of gross income.
The Supreme
Court agreed with this position. Id. at 33.
While the Court preferred the taxpayer’s
interpretation, it did note that “it cannot
be said that the language is unambiguous.”Id.
In order to resolve any ambiguity, the Court
turned to the legislative history of the
statute. When it did so, the Court found in
that
history
“persuasive
evidence
that
Congress
was
addressing
itself
to
the
specific situation where a taxpayer actually
omitted some receipt or accrual in its
computation of gross income, and not more
generally to errors in that computation
arising from other causes.” Id.
Justice Harlan, who wrote for the Court, said
that in enacting the provision:

5

Congress
manifested
no
broader
purpose
than
to
give
the
Commissioner an additional two [now
three] years to investigate tax
returns in cases where, because of a
taxpayer’s omission to report some
tangible item, the Commissioner is
at
a
special
disadvantage
in
detecting errors. … [W]hen, as here,
the understatement of a tax arises
from an error in reporting an item
disclosed on the face of the return
the Commissioner is at no such
disadvantage.
And this would seem
to be so whether the error be one
affecting “gross income” or one,
such
as
overstated
deductions,
affecting other parts of the return.
To
accept
the
Commissioner’s
interpretation and to impose a fiveyear limitation when such errors
affect “gross income,” but a threeyear limitation when they do not,
not only would be to read § 275(c)
more broadly than as justified by
the
evident
reason
for
its
enactment, but also to create a
patent incongruity in the tax law.
Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit and sided with the Third, Fifth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits in its construction
of the phrase “omits from income” to mean
failure to include specific receipts or
accrual of income in excess of 25 percent of
the amount stated in the return, and not where
the income and receipts are all stated but
then reduced by an overly large basis as
disclosed on a return.
The Court also noted that, while it was
construing former Section 275(c) of the 1939
Tax Code, “we observe that the conclusion that
6

we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous
language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.” Id. at 38.
V.

HISTORY AFTER COLONY
A.

LAW BEFORE 2000
For a number of years following Colony, the
issue of extending the statute of limitations
from three years to six in an “overstated
basis” case appeared to have been settled.
Other than attempting to distinguish Colony in
a few other cases, the IRS seemed content to
abide by the Court’s ruling.
See, e.g.,
Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.),
cert denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); CC&FW
Operations Ltd. v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 402
(1st Cir. 2001). In 1976, the IRS recognized
Colony as “[t]he landmark” case construing §
6501(e), while acknowledging that Colony’s
holding is “in harmony with” § 6501(e)(1)(A).
IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 36856 (Sept. 21, 1976).

B.

SON-OF-BOSS
The IRS’s position on Colony changed, however,
in the early 2000s, with the advent of a
transaction that became known as “Son-ofBOSS.”
In a Son-of-BOSS transaction a
taxpayer uses some mechanism, often a short
sale, to increase his basis in an asset before
the asset is sold.
In August 2000, the IRS
issued notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which
set forth, in some detail, the IRS’s position
that tax consequences claimed by taxpayers in
connection with Son-of-BOSS transactions were
contrary to the intent of the Code. The IRS
contended – and several courts have agreed –
that
these
transactions
lacked
“economic
substance” and, in the ensuing months and
years, the IRS took several steps to identify
and educate its examiners about transactions
fitting the Son-of-BOSS pattern.
Brief for
Respondents p. 10.
7

Meanwhile, the IRS began an aggressive program
of asserting tax deficiencies related to Sonof-BOSS in similar transactions, even when the
three year limitations period had expired. In
such cases, the IRS advanced the argument that
the Supreme Court
holding in Colony applied
only in the context of the sale of goods or
services by a trade or business and not to a
taxpayer’s basis in property.
The Tax Court
rejected that argument, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v.
Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth
Circuit. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States,
573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
VI.

FACTS RELEVANT TO HOME CONCRETE
A.

Home Concrete began as a small business in
Salisbury, North Carolina that had been in
operation for more than 50 years before the
transactions at issue in the case occurred.
Robert Pierce and Stephen Chandler became the
principal owners and day-to-day managers of
the company in 1985. By 1999, Mr. Pierce, who
owned approximately 81% of the outstanding
shares, decided to retire and sell the
business.
Being a small business owner with
no expertise in such matters, Pierce sought
financial planning advice from several highly
recommended financial and legal professionals.
Upon advice from those professionals, the
following transactions occurred prior to the
sale of the business:
(1) Home Concrete & Supply, LLC was
formed on April 15, 1999.
Home
Concrete’s
initial
members
were
Pierce, Chandler, Home Oil, and two
trusts for the benefit of Pierce’s
children
(collectively,
the
“partners”).

8

(2) On
May
13,
1999,
each
partner
commenced a short sale of Treasury
notes.
(3) On
May
17,
1999,
each
partner
contributed the proceeds from the
short
sales
of
Treasury
notes,
together with the short Treasury
note positions and margin cash, to
Home
Concrete
as
capital
contributions.
(4) On May 18, 1999, Home Concrete
closed
its
Treasury
note
short
positions
by
purchasing
Treasury
notes in the open market.
(5) On
June
11,
1999,
Home
Oil
transferred substantially all of its
business assets to Home Concrete as
a capital contribution.
(6) On June 14, 1999, each partner
transferred a percentage of its
membership
interests
in
Home
Concrete to Home Oil as a capital
contribution to Home Oil.
(7) In connection with such transfers,
Home
Concrete
made
an
election
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 754 to step
up the basis of its assets.
(8) On August 31, 1999, Home Concrete
sold substantially all of its assets
to a third party for a gross sales
price of $10,623,348.
Brief for Respondents, pp. 12-13.
Home Concrete timely filed its partnership tax
return on or before April 17, 2000.
That
return reported the sale of Home Concrete’s
assets, including the gross sales price
($10,623,348),
the
partnership’s
original
basis ($4,542,824.36), the election to adjust
its basis, and the resulting stepped-up basis
($10,527,350.53). Home Concrete
9

also attached Form 8594 (Asset Acquisition
Statement Under Section 1060), on which it
reported
the
third-party
purchaser’s
information and the fair market value of the
sold assets.
Brief for Respondents p. 13.
The partners also filed their returns which,
among other things, disclosed that “during the
year the proceeds of a short sale not closed
by the taxpayer were received.” Id. at 14.
For unknown reasons, the IRS did not begin
auditing Home Concrete’s 1999 return until
almost six years after it was filed.
In a
letter dated February 23, 2006, the IRS
notified
Mr. Pierce
that
Home
Concrete’s
return had “been selected for examination”
because of a Son-of-BOSS transaction.
On
September 7, 2006, the IRS issued a Notice of
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment
(FPAA), in which the IRS asserted that Home
Concrete’s claimed basis in the sale of its
assets was grossly overstated.
The IRS did
not
allege
that
the
1999
returns
were
fraudulent. Id.
VII.

THE HOME CONCRETE LITIGATION
A.

On December 5, 2006, Home Concrete filed a
Complaint in the Eastern District of North
Carolina, seeking a declaration that the FPAA
was bared by the three year statute of
limitations.
In addition to declaratory
relief, Mr. Pierce (the tax matters partner)
sought the return of $1,392,118 he deposited
with the Court, plus any accrued interest.
The IRS argued that the FPAA was timely
because the six year statute of limitations
contained in § 6501(e)(1)(A) had not run.
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.

B.

On March 9, 2009, the district court agreed
with
the
IRS,
granting
partial
summary
judgment in its favor and rejecting Home
10

Concrete’s argument
different result.

that

Colony

required

a

VIII. THE NEW TREASURARY REGULATIONS

IX.

A.

In September 2009, during the pendency of the
Home Concrete case, and following losses on
this issue in the Ninth and Federal Circuits,
the IRS issued new temporary regulations under
§ 65013, purporting to limit the statutory
language at issue in Colony to situations
involving the sale of goods or services by a
trade or business.
74 Fed. Reg. 49, 321
(September 28, 2009).

B.

In December, 2010, the IRS withdrew the
temporary regulations and issued virtually
identical final regulations.
755 Fed. Reg.
78, 897 (December 17, 2010).

FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN HOME CONCRETE AND CIRCUIT
SPLIT
A.

On February 7, 2011, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the trial court, concluding that the
Supreme Court decision in Colony “forecloses
the argument that Home Concrete’s overstated
basis in its reporting of the short sale
proceeds resulted in an omission from its
reported gross income.”
Home Concrete and
Supply, LLC v. U.S., 634 F.3d 249, 255 (4th
Cir. 2011).
The Fourth Circuit also refused
to apply the new IRS regulations retroactively
because
the
regulations
appear
to
be
prospective only and purported “to establish a
rule contrary to Colony to subject the

3

In 1982, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA), which created a unified procedure for determining the tax
treatment of all partnership items at the partnership level.
TEFRA added
§ 6229(c)(2), which contains language substantively identical to that of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A), but applies only to partnerships.
Section 6229(c)(2) does
not contain the language that appears in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A).
The new temporary and final regulations discussed herein
purport to apply to § 6229 as well as § 6501.
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taxpayers to the extended limitations period
ten years later.” Id. at 257.
B.

Judge Wilkinson joined the Court’s opinion in
full but wrote separately to stress that the
IRS’ attempt to limit the holding in Colony
“pass[es] the point where the beneficial
application of agency expertise gives way to a
lack
of
accountability
and
risk
of
arbitrariness.” Id. at 259.

C.

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Home Concrete
was in accord with decisions from the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits.
See Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767
(9th Cir. 2009); Burks v. United States, 633
F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 2011).
By contrast, the
Seventh, Tenth and DC Circuits adopted the
IRS’ view and/or followed the new regulations,
thus declining to following Colony. See Beard
v Commissioner, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d
929 (10th Cir. 2011); Intermountain Insurance
Services of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 650
F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011).4
Thus, there was a clear conflict among the
circuits when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Home Concrete.

X.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
A.

IRS Arguments.
arguments:
(1)

The

IRS

focused

on

three

The Code defines “gross income” for
federal tax purposes as all income
from
whatever
source
derived,
specifically
including
“gains

4

Interestingly, the Federal Circuit had an intra-circuit conflict in that it
held in favor of the taxpayers with respect to the application of Colony
before the IRS regulations became final but ruled against the taxpayers after
the regulations took effect.
See Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States, 573
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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derived
from
dealings
in
real
property,”
which,
in
turn,
is
defined as “the excess of the amount
realized over the unrecovered cost
or other basis for the property sold
or
exchanged.”
26
U.S.C.
§ 61(a)(3).
Because a gain on a
sale of property is determined by
subtracting
the
taxpayer’s
basis
from the sale price, a taxpayer can
improperly report income from a
property sale either by overstating
his basis in the property or by
understating
the
property’s
sale
price.
In this case, the taxpayer
“stepped-up” its basis pursuant to
the
Son-of-BOSS
transaction
described above.
According to the
IRS, overstating basis has the same
effect
as
understating
the
partnership’s sale price.
Both
scenarios, according to the IRS, fit
squarely into the definition of an
“omission from gross income.”
(2) The IRS argued that two adjacent
statutory provisions within Section
6501(e) support the conclusion that
an overstatement of basis amounts to
an omission from gross income:
(a) Subparagraph (i) of Section
6501(e)(1)(A),
added
in
1954,
creates
an
“exception” to the general
rule that applies only to a
trade or business.
That
subparagraph, according to
the IRS, was enacted to
eliminate the possibility
that a trade or business
could trigger the six year
assessment
period
by
overstating its basis in
13

property
sold.
This
special rule for trades and
businesses
would
be
unnecessary, according to
the IRS, if the phrase
“omits from gross income an
amount
properly
included
therein” already excluded
understatements of income
attributable
to
overstatements
of
basis.
Brief
for
the
United
States, p. 21.
(b) Section 6501(e)(2), which
applies to estate and gift
taxes, gives the IRS six
years from the filing of a
return to assess additional
tax “if the taxpayer omits
. . . items includable” in
the
gross
estate.
26
U.S.C.
§ 6501(e)(2)
(emphasis
added).
According
to
the
IRS,
Congress
used
the
term
“items” to “make it clear
that the six-year period is
not to apply merely because
of differences between the
taxpayer and the Government
as
to
valuation
of
property.”
Brief for the
United States, p. 23.
By
contrast,
Section
6501(e)(1)(A) provides for
a
six
year
assessment
period
“if
the
taxpayer
omits from gross income an
amount properly includable
therein.”
26
U.S.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)
(emphasis
added).
The IRS argued
that Congress’s reference
14

to “amounts” rather than
“items” strongly suggests
that
the
six
year
assessment period applies
both in cases where an item
of
income
is
completely
left
off
and
situations
where the amount of gross
income is understated due
to
an
error
in
the
calculation. Id.
(3) Finally, the IRS argued that the new
regulations resolve the dispute in
the IRS’s favor once and for all.
Colony was construing the older
statute, not the new one; and the
Court expressly stated that it was
not
addressing
the
statute
as
enacted in 1954.
In any event,
Colony recognized that the statutory
language was ambiguous, thus leaving
room for the IRS to clarify the
ambiguity
by
regulation,
which
regulation is, in turn, entitled to
deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v.
MRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Mayo
of Foundation v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 704 (2011); National Cable &
Telecoms Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967
(2005).5
B.

Taxpayer Arguments. The taxpayer rebutted the
IRS arguments as follows:
(1)

Colony controls the outcome of this
case.
Colony construed the very
language at issue in this case in
the taxpayer’s favor, holding that
an overstatement of basis does not

5

There were additional arguments, argued vigorously by both sides, regarding
the promulgation, effective date and retroactivity of the new regulations,
but these were not reached by the Supreme Court.
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constitute an omission from gross
income
in
order
to
extend
the
statute of limitations.
The IRS’s
reliance on the Code’s definition of
“gross income” is the same argument
that the IRS made in the Supreme
Court in Colony which was rejected
because the Court chose to focus
instead on the word “omits,” which
is not defined in the Code but is
instead entitled to its ordinary
meaning, which the Court said means
“to leave out” or “to fail to
include or mention.”
Brief for
Respondents, p. 23.
In this case,
the taxpayer included all income and
receipts
from
the
sale
of
its
business on its return, as well as
including the original basis, the
election to step up the basis, and
the increased basis on the face of
the return.
Thus, under Colony,
there was no “omission” at all.
(2)

The
relevant
statutory
language
“omits from gross income an amount
properly
includable
therein”
was
enacted in 1934 and carried forward
by Congress not only in the 1954
Code but also through a total of six
substantive amendments to the 1954
Code
thereafter.
Brief
for
Respondents, p. 9.

(3)

Subparagraph
(i)
to
Section
6501(e)(1)(A) is not an “exception”
to the general rule but rather a
clarification
of
it.
That
subparagraph was added shortly after
the Third Circuit’s decision in
Uptegrove Lumber v. Commissioner,
204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1953).
The
Third Circuit decided that despite
the definition of gross income and
16

the regulations for a manufacturing,
merchandising or mining business,
which included the total sales, less
the
cost
of
goods
sold,
the
legislative history was clear that
Congress intended to extend the
statute only in situations where an
item of income was left out, not
when there was an error in the
computation.
Thus,
the
Third
Circuit decided the case in favor of
the taxpayer, who happened to be a
trade or business. The better, more
sensible,
explanation
for
the
addition of (i) is simply that it
was added to codify the result in
Uptegrove Lumber in the context of a
trade or business – because a need
for
a
clarification
in
that
particular
circumstance
had
been
brought to the attention of Congress
immediately prior to enacting the
new provision.
Brief in Opposition
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
p. 22.
Additionally,
Colony
cannot
be
limited in the way the IRS contends
because Colony involved the sale of
real property, which is neither a
“good” nor a “service,” as referred
to in (i). Because subparagraph (i)
would not have applied on the facts
of Colony, it is inconceivable that
the Supreme Court’s statement that
its interpretation of the prior
statute was “in harmony with” the
new one embraced the government’s
reading of the statute – which would
wipe
out
Colony.
Brief
for
Respondents p. 32.
(4)

The
IRS’s
reliance
on
6501(e)(2) is misplaced.
17

Section
Congress

added paragraph (e)(2) as part of
the 1954 amendments, to cover estate
and gift taxes. This section has no
application
to
income
taxes.
Moreover, Colony already considered
the IRS’s “amount” argument and
specifically
rejected
it.
Congress’s
post-Colony
change
in
1965 to the heading of Section 6501
– from “omission from gross income”
to “substantial omission of items” –
underscores that Congress understood
and
affirmatively
endorsed
the
Colony
holding.
Brief
for
Respondents, P. 35.
(5)

The new regulation does not, and
cannot, compel a different result
here.
The Court’s decision in
Colony definitely declared “what the
law is” with respect to the key
statutory
question
at
issue.
Marbury
v.
Madison,
5
U.S.
(1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Applying
the traditional tools of statutory
construction, the Supreme Court in
Colony concluded that Congress had
“directly spoken to the precise
question
at
issue,”
and
had
instructed that an “omission from
gross income” occurred only when
item of gross income had been left
out
entirely.
Brief
for
Respondents, P. 37. For purposes of
stare decisis, the statutory holding
must govern.
Since the Court has
spoken to the precise question at
issue, there is no room for the
agency
to
overrule
Colony
by
“reinterpreting” the statute because
there is no gap for the agency to
fill.
For that reason alone, the
IRS’s
reliance
on
Brand
X
is
misplaced.
Congress’s ratification
18

of
the
Supreme
Court’s
interpretation
removes
any
doubt
that the agency is not free to adopt
a
different
one.
Brief
for
Respondent pp. 38-9.
XI.

SUPREME COURT DECISION

In a five to four decision, with Justice Scalia filing
a separate concurring opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the taxpayer.
A.

THE OPINION
The Court agreed with the taxpayer that Colony
determines the outcome of this case.
132
S.Ct. at 1841.
The Justice Breyer, writing
for the Court, said:
The provision before us is a 1954
reenactment of the 1939 provision
that
Colony
interpreted.
The
operative language is identical. It
would
be
difficult,
perhaps
impossible,
to
give
the
same
language
here
a
different
interpretation without effectively
overruling
Colony,
a
course
of
action that basic principles of
stare decisis wisely counsel us not
to take.
Id.
The Court rejected the IRS’s argument that the
inclusion of (i) in the relevant section and
the mention of “items” in the gifts and
estates section in the 1954 Code changes the
outcome. Justice wrote that “these points are
too
fragile
to
bear
the
significant
argumentative weight the Government seeks to
place upon them.” Id.
With respect to (i), the Court agreed with the
taxpayer’s argument that a plausible reason
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why Congress added (i) was to settle the thencurrent debate over how the statute operated
with respect to the sale of goods and services
by a trade or business and to codify Uptegrove
Lumber.
The Court also pointed out that (i)
explains how to calculate whether or not the
taxpayer has exceeded the 25 percent threshold
in the trade or business context.
Id. at
1842.
The Court viewed the IRS’s argument regarding
the estate and gift tax “item” language as an
even weaker one. The opinion pointed out that
a similar argument had been raised and
rejected by the Court in Colony itself.
As
Justice Breyer put it:
But to rely in the case before us on
this solitary word change in a
different subsection is like hoping
that a new bat boy will change the
outcome of the World Series.
Id.
Dealing with the IRS’s new regulation, the
Court recognized the IRS’s argument that the
regulation was entitled to Chevron deference
but pointed out that the regulation is
“entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior
court
decision
holds
that
its
construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute … .
National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(emphasis in original).”
Although the Court
recognized
that
Colony
itself
had
characterized
the
statute
as
“not
unambiguous,” this did not mean that the IRS
is automatically entitled to win the case by
enacting the regulation:
We do not accept this argument.
In
our
view,
Colony
has
already
interpreted the statute, and there
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is
no
longer
any
different
construction that is consistent with
Colony and available for adoption by
the agency.
Id. at 1843.
Although not joined by Justice Scalia in the
remaining reasoning, the Court went on to
explain why the IRS was not entitled to change
the outcome where the statute had been
declared “not unambiguous” in Colony.
The
Court reasoned that it does not automatically
follow from a pre-Chevron reference to a
linguistic
ambiguity
that
Congress
has
delegated gap-filling power to the agency.
Id. at 1844. This was true because the Colony
court examined the statute carefully, finding
that the taxpayer had the better side of the
textual argument (regarding the definition of
“omission”); and it examined the legislative
history and concluded that Congress had
decided the question definitively, leaving no
room for the agency to reach a contrary
result. Id.
The Court also agreed with the
Colony’s
conclusion
that
the
IRS’s
interpretation
would
“create
at
patent
incongruity in the tax law” (by treating
overstated basis differently from overstated
deductions). Id.
Finally, Colony’s finding
that its interpretation of the 1939 Code was
“in
harmony
with
the
[now]
unambiguous
language” of the 1954 Code, suggests that the
Colony Court saw nothing in the new Code as
being inconsistent with its conclusion. Id.
Thus, the Court reasoned that the Court in
Colony concluded that the statute left no gap
to be filled by the IRS. The Court concluded:
Given principles of stare decisis,
we
must
follow
[Colony’s]
interpretation.
And there being no
gap to fill, the government’s gapfilling
regulation
cannot
change
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Colony’s
interpretation
of
the
statute. We agree with the taxpayer
that overstatements of basis, and
not the resulting understatement of
gross income, do not trigger the
extended
limitations
period
of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A).
Id.
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment.
In his view, Colony
determines the outcome in this case because of
“justifiable
taxpayer
reliance”
on
that
decision.
However, Justice Scalia took the opportunity
to amplify his dissent in Brand X by pointing
out
the
difficulty
in
evaluating
the
ambiguous/non-ambiguous
determination
of
statutes made in cases decided pre-Chevron.
He pointed out that pre-Chevron Courts had no
idea that their rulings might be changed by an
agency regulation if they found the statute to
be ambiguous.
Id. at 1846.
He also argued
that the plurality’s rationale for finding
that there was no gap to be filled (textual
argument,
legislative
history,
patent
incongruity, in harmony with new statute) are
the sorts of arguments that courts use in
resolving ambiguities. Id. at 1848. Justice
Scalia concluded:
“Rather than making our judicialreview jurisprudence curiouser and
curiouser, the Court should abandon
the opinion that produces these
contortions, Brand X.
I join the
judgment announced by the Court
because it is indisputable that
Colony resolved the construction of
the statutory language at issue
here, and that construction must
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therefore control.
And I join in
the Court’s opinion except for part
IV-C.”
Id.
C.

THE DISSENT
Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, joined by
Justices
Ginsburg,
Sotomayor
and
Kagan.
Essentially, these Justices agreed with the
IRS that the amendments to the 1954 Code (the
addition of (i) and the “items” provision in
the estate and gift tax section) “may not
compel the opposite conclusion under the new
statute, but they strongly favor it.
As a
result, there was room for the Treasury
Department to interpret the new provision in
that manner.” Id. at 1851.
In other words, the dissent agreed with the
IRS’s position that “a judicial construction
of an ambiguous statute did not foreclose an
agency’s later, inconsistent interpretation of
the same provision.” Id.
The dissent would
avoid saying that the IRS can overrule the
prior Supreme Court decision in Colony by
concluding that Colony did not interpret the
same statute, with its amendments, as it is
being interpreted today.
Justice Kennedy
concluded that:
The Court goes too far, in my
respectful
view,
in
constricting
Congress’s ability to leave agencies
in charge of filling statutory gaps.
Id. at 1852.
Thus, the dissent would give full effect to
the new IRS regulations, which in turn would
dictate that the six-year statute, not the
three-year statute, applies in this case. Id.
at 1853.
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XII.

CONCLUSION
The clear holding by the Home Concrete majority is
that an overstatement of basis in sold property
does not qualify as an “omission from gross
income” for purposes of extending the period for
assessment of a deficiency against a taxpayer from
three years to six years.
This ruling should
apply generally to “overstatement of basis” cases
–
not
just
Son-of-BOSS
cases—unless
another
statutory
exception
applies.6
See,
e.g.,
Wilmington Partners, LP, et al. v. Commissioner,
2012 U.S. App. Lexis 18941(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2012)
(partnership’s increase in basis outside the
context
of
Son-of-BOSS
transactions
did
not
qualify as an “omission from gross income” under
26 U.S.C. § 6229(c)(2)).
Beyond the specific holding of Home Concrete, the
Supreme Court has left doubt as to the gap-filling
authority of the IRS and other federal agencies by
regulation in pre-Chevron cases.
The plurality
would deny the agencies the authority to fill gaps
where the pre-Chevron court examined the statute
and
gave
it
a
clear
interpretation
under
traditional
rules
of
statutory
construction,
despite
apparent
ambiguity
in
the
statutory
language.
Justice Scalia would take a different
approach by abandoning the ambiguous/unambiguous
analysis in pre-Chevron cases altogether.
And
four of the current Justices would grant the
regulatory
agencies
authority
to
change
the
outcome of judicial decisions where the Court has
found a relevant statutory ambiguity. It remains
to be seen which of these views will prevail in
the future.

6
In 2004, Congress amended € 6501 by adding a new subsection (c) (10) which
provides that, in the case of a “listed” transaction like “Son-of-BOSS,” the
limitations period for assessing tax does not expire until one year after the
taxpayer submits certain information.
However, this exception only applies
to tax years with respect to which the period for assessing a deficiency “did
not expire” before October 22, 2004.
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As for post-Chevron cases, the message seems to be
clear:
the best way to avoid unwanted agency
regulation of areas within its expertise is for
the court to find that Congress has addressed the
precise question at issue by unambiguous statutory
pronouncement.
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